In spite of allegations, suspicion and, in some cases, evidence that the police manipulate the crime statistics, the annual release of the crime statistics by the South African Police Service (SAPS) continues to engender huge media and public interest. This is probably because it is the only official indication of how safe or unsafe we are. The figures recorded by the South African Banking Risk and Information Centre (SABRIC) and the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (CGCSA) for crimes such as bank and cash-intransit robberies, ATM attacks and business robberies, allow us, in a limited number of cases, to verify the credibility of the police's crime figures. The results of the ISS victim survey (conducted every four to five years) are an additional source of data that allows for a comparison of the trends evident from the police statistics.
The 2008/9 crime statistics present a worrying trend. After five consecutive years of seeing a consistent decrease in the overall rate of crime, it appears that this year crime is again on the increase. As indicated by the graph in Figure 1 , the rate of decrease, which started in 2003/04 (when our crime rate peaked), already showed signs of slowing down in 2006/07 and 2007/08. In the 2008/09 reporting period the trend is clearly upward. The second major worry about the latest crime figures is the continued increase in the socalled trio crimes (house robberies, business robberies and car hijackings), and truck hijackings. For the first time also the first two of these trio crimes increased in all nine provinces, while car hijacking increased in seven provinces.
This article briefly considers the controversy around the validity of the police's crime statistics before discussing in more detail some of the worrying trends emerging from this year's crime report.
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HOW CREDIBLE ARE THE SAPS CRIME STATISTICS?
The short answer to this question is that we simply don't know. Over the past few months there were a number of media reports relating to allegations that the police are manipulating the crime In summary, there clearly are some legitimate concerns about the credibility of the police's crime statistics, but overall the general trends indicated by these statistics are corroborated by independent data. This allows us, albeit with caution, to draw a few critical conclusions from the 2008/09 crime statistics and to determine what the most worrying trends are.
THE WORRYING TRENDS IN THE 2008/09 CRIME STATISTICS 7
Although murder continues its downward trend of the last fourteen years (Figure 2 ), it remains a concern at 37,3 per hundred thousand, compared to the latest 'global homicide rate' estimated at 7,6 per hundred thousand. 8 The most notable increases are in the aggravated robbery category and in particular in three of its seven subcategories, the so-called trio crimes (house robberies, business robberies and car hijackings).
The third worrying trend relates to increases in crimes targeting the business sector.
Murder
The good news about the murder rate is that it achieved an overall decrease of 44 per cent since it peaked at 67,9 per 100 000 in 1995/96 (Figure 2 ). The current rate is 37,3. In real figures this translates to 18 148 murders; 1,8 per cent down from 18 487 in the previous reporting period. The sad news is that at this rate it will take us at least another ten to twelve years to reach even the 'global homicide rate' of 7,6, unless we find a way to reduce crime, violent crime in particular. Figure 3 provides the murder rate for twelve countries, including South Africa. 9 There is, of course, a long list of countries with murder rates below one and two per 100 000, and probably a few with murder rates above or comparable to that of Honduras. But due to the unavailability, nonreporting or even non-existence of credible crime figures for all countries, it is impossible to determine precisely where South Africa would fit on a global scale for homicide or murder. It is encouraging to note that a country such as 9 5 / 9 6 9 6 / 9 7 9 7 / 9 8 9 8 / 9 9 9 9 / 0 0 0 was able to bring that rate down by 43 per cent to 36 per 100 000 within the relatively short space of eight years. By comparison, in 2000 South Africa's murder rate was 49,6 and during the same period we only managed to reduce our murder rate by 26 per cent. From these figures it is obvious that something positive is happening in Colombia that is worth looking at.
According to Mayra Buvinic, chief of the Social Program Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Colombia's success is due to initiatives such as the Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security Program that was implemented in a number of Colombian cities, including Bogota, Cali and Medellin; and given financial assistance by the IDB. 10 In these initiatives five key factors were crucial:
• Political commitment, especially in relation to the complex institutional and social changes that were required.
• Improving the performance and professionalism of the police. This was achieved inter alia through the allocation of more resources and improved training.
• Security was treated as only one component of a broad social strategy. Law enforcement of the 'crack-down' type had a limited effect and was rather designed to complement measures to improve public transport and road safety; to provide safe recreational areas; and to upgrade infrastructure and services in low-income neighbourhoods.
• In Bogota law enforcement agencies established better cooperation and coordination.
• Bogota also focused on community involvement such as the 'Frentes de Seguridad' (neighbourhood crime monitoring committees). This greatly enhanced the legitimacy of the police.
The Colombian focus on social and infrastructure development, and on improving service delivery in poor or low-income communities, should be considered against the background of service delivery protests in South Africa in the last few months. In a recent docket analysis by the SAPS, representing a sample of 1 348 murder cases nationally for the period April 2007 to March 2008, the impact of social behaviour on the prevalence of murder was confirmed. 11 The analysis showed that almost two thirds (65,4 per cent) of these murders happened as a result of specific forms of social behaviour; 26,3 per cent was the result of criminal activities; 6,9 per cent was the result of group behaviour (vigilantism, gang activity or taxi violence); and 1,5 per cent was caused by accidental killings. A logical assumption would be that this is also true for various other violent crimes.
Violent crimes other than murder also decreased significantly. According to Gareth Newham, special projects manager in the Gauteng Department of Community Safety, violent crime in general in Bogota decreased by 75 per cent between 1996 and 2001. 12 This was possible because of the reasons mentioned above, but also because of greatly improved crime intelligence that saw the arrest and detention rates of wanted criminals increase by 500 per cent.
Aggravated robbery
Unlike murder, and in spite of periodic and relatively small decreases, aggravated robbery remains at a level between 200-300 per 100 000 (Figure 4) . The current figure of 249,3 is up by 0,8 per cent from the 2007/08 figure, after a decrease of 7,4 per cent the year before. As indicated in Figure 4 , this is 52 per cent up from where we were (164) in 1996/97 when aggravated robbery was considered a major crime threat. This crime category comprises seven subcategories and it is in particular the trio crimes that cause the biggest concern. The other four sub-categories of aggravated robbery are street robbery (-7,4 per cent), cash-in-transit robbery (-2,3 per cent), bank robbery (-29,2 per cent) and truck hijacking (+15,4 per cent).
The trio crimes are currently South Africa's biggest crime threat and it is obvious that whatever we are doing to fight them is not working. This is not only a reflection of police performance, but the result of a combination of factors, including the performance of the criminal justice system and government in general.
The graph in Figure 5 clearly shows how all three the trio crime types have been increasing over the last number of years. The increases appear to be gaining momentum, probably because of the development of another extremely worrying trend. Both house robbery and business robbery have increased in all nine provinces, and car hijacking in seven provinces. In some provinces the increases are much faster than in others. Limpopo, for example, previously regarded as a stable province with relatively low levels of violent crime, now experiences some of the highest increases in trio crimes. Measured over a three-year period, from 2006/07 to 2008/09, the trio crimes in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape registered huge increases (Table 1 ). Western Cape (24,4 per cent) and North West (one per cent).
Crimes against the business sector
The two graphs in Figure 7 highlight four crimes that are clearly aimed at the business sector, and all four of these have been on the increase over the last four to five years. To this can be added burglary at non-residential premises (largely business premises). It is perhaps too early to conclude that there is a correlation between the increased targeting of the business sector and the current economic recession, but there are a few indicators that appear to point in that direction. For example, in a September 2009 press release by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa the following observation is made:
… in shoplifting the spread of incidents is much more even, reflecting the levels of poverty in Eastern and Northern Cape and other rural communities. This is coupled to a swing towards the shoplifting of food, which is indicative of the effects of the recession.
14 In addition, Professor Haroon Bhorat, who teaches economics at the University of Cape Town, said in a briefing to Parliament on 25 September that South Africa was now the 'most unequal society in the world' with a significant increase in income inequality. 15 According to him this is, in the long run, bad for growth and a threat to social stability.
CONCLUSION
The above statistics and discussion presents us with four key messages:
• That sub-categories of violent crimes, and in particular aggravated robbery, of house and business robbery and car hijacking, are dangerously close to becoming out of control.
• That although the targeting of the business sector is not new, the increases in crimes relating to this sector are significantly higher than with other crimes, and have serious economic and social implications.
• That whatever we are doing to combat these crimes is not working.
• That building on the lessons from Colombia, the situation can be turned around if we have the will and if we understand that fixing the criminal justice system, and in particular the police, important as it is, is not enough.
What appears to be necessary is an integrated, overarching and well-coordinated approach that includes efforts to address the problems of the criminal justice system, while addressing inequality and other social problems.
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